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I. INTRODUCTION
 With the 2018 confirmation of Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the notion that the 
Supreme Court enjoys insulation from partisan politics is on the verge of extinction.1 
In the eyes of the public, it is certain that the Court will be viewed as a political unit 
motivated, at least in part, to further political ends. Now more than ever, the Court 
needs a tool that will reestablish the public’s faith that it will exercise independent 
judgment in deciding the law. The doctrine of stare decisis serves as the appropriate 
agenda-limiting function necessary to curb the—perceived or actual—politicization 
of the Court. However, in its current state, the doctrine of stare decisis is too weak to 
serve that function.
 Restructuring the stare decisis analysis, along with an increased focus on the 
reliance interests involved in overturning or upholding precedent, will serve to 
strengthen this doctrine and help reestablish the Court’s legitimacy as an apolitical 
body. Most importantly, the reconceptualization of stare decisis will help limit the 
ability of the Court to overturn precedent as a means to achieve contemporary 
political ends. This Note traces the evolution of the stare decisis doctrine, contends 
that Justice Samuel Alito’s 2018 majority opinion in Janus v. AFSCME, Council 312 
significantly weakened the doctrine, and explores a solution to strengthen it.
 The doctrine of stare decisis, while still legitimate, is wielded inconsistently, 
relied on at random, and in a constant state of f lux.3 Stare decisis plays an important 
role in the legal system—it promotes system stability and legitimacy, and strengthens 
settled law, such as the prohibition of racial discrimination by the government.4 How 
the doctrine is used is relatively clear when deciding cases at one of two extremes. 
On one end of the spectrum are “super-precedent”—cases that set forth well-settled 
norms and are essentially irreversible, as any change would destabilize the government 
and society.5 In super-precedent, stare decisis serves an agenda-limiting function by 
removing certain constitutional questions from reconsideration.6 At the other end of 
the spectrum are cases in which the Court encounters precedent that is fundamentally 
1. See Zack Beauchamp, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Crisis is Here, Vox (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.
vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/6/17915854/brett-kavanaugh-senate-confirmed-supreme-court-
legitimacy.
2. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
3. Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 411, 414 (2010). Kozel 
explains: 
The catalog of factors that inform the stare decisis inquiry is lengthy and uncertain . . . . 
The sheer number of these considerations, combined with the fact that the Court often 
selects a few items from the catalog without explaining how much work is being done 
by each, makes it difficult even to find a starting point for thinking critically about stare 
decisis as a judicial doctrine.
 Id.
4. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
5. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1204, 1205–10 (2006).
6. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 745 
(1988).
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incompatible with contemporary society.7 Application of stare decisis in these cases 
would only perpetuate laws that are irreconcilable with modern times; such precedent 
can be overturned without objection.8
 Between these two extremes, of course, lie the difficult cases. The question of 
when and how to apply stare decisis to these cases remains contested and is rooted in 
two competing viewpoints.9 The strict view promotes legitimacy, consistency, and 
continuity, and argues that precedent should be granted deference, regardless of the 
prior decisions’ reasoning.10 Conversely, the lax view argues that responsiveness to 
contemporary issues demands a more forgiving and flexible doctrine of stare decisis.11
 Courts look at several factors when conducting a stare decisis analysis to 
determine whether precedent should be followed.12 Factors frequently cited as 
important include: (1) the precedent’s soundness of reasoning; (2) the workability of 
the precedent in contemporary times; (3) legal developments since the precedent 
came down that may have “eroded” the decision’s “underpinnings,” and (4) the 
7. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Note that Plessy was not overruled by a single case. 
Rather, in Brown, the Court initially declared segregation in public schools unconstitutional. Brown, 
347 U.S. at 495. The Court would go on to extend Brown in a series of cases that declared segregation 
unconstitutional in various public settings—essentially eviscerating Plessy in piecemeal fashion. See 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 795–98 (4th ed. 2013).
8. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that the Texas statute making it a crime 
for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain sexual acts violated the Due Process Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, expressly overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding statutes that restrict the freedom to marry solely based on racial classifications 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, expressly overruling Pace v. Alabama, 106 
U.S. 583 (1883)).
9. Colin Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role of Precedent in the Unfolding Dialectic of Brady v. 
Maryland, 46 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 77, 90–91 (2012). Any Supreme Court decision in which there is a 
dissenting opinion that involves potentially reversing precedent will inevitably contain a discussion of 
stare decisis. For example, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the majority opinion found 
that stare decisis did not serve to uphold the precedent in question. See 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010). 
However, in his dissent, Justice Paul Stevens argued that the doctrine of stare decisis should have 
applied. Id. at 478–79.
10. Starger, supra note 9, at 90. See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (“[A] 
decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was 
wrongly decided.”). 
11. Starger, supra note 9, at 91. This view was articulated by Justice Louis Brandeis in Burnet v. Coronado 
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–06 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Hertz v. Woodman, 218 
U.S. 205, 212 (1910) (“The rule of stare decisis, though one tending to consistency and uniformity of 
decision, is not inf lexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within 
the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided.”).
12. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2458 (2018) (“An analysis of several important factors 
. . . should be taken into account in deciding whether to overrule a past decision[.]”).
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reliance interests13 at stake.14 Undoubtedly, the potential impact on the people and 
governmental institutions should be deliberated whenever the Court considers 
overruling precedent. Recently, however, when articulating the reason for overturning 
precedent, the Court has begun to dismiss reliance interests and instead has focused 
on the reasoning of the decision in question.15 This inconsistent—and often 
incoherent—approach has drawn criticism as the Court invokes stare decisis at 
seemingly random points, strengthening the suspicion that the Court is manipulating 
the doctrine as a way to achieve varying political ends.16
 This trend continued in 2018 when the Court, in Janus,17 overturned its 1977 
decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education18 In Janus, the Court held that 
government workers who choose not to join public unions cannot be forced to pay for 
collective bargaining.19 In doing so, the Court overturned its decision in Abood that 
required nonmembers of a public union to help pay for the union’s collective bargaining 
13. Reliance interests are a form of remedy that intends to “put [the nonbreaching party back] in the position 
that would have resulted if the contract had not been made, including out-of-pocket costs.” Reliance 
Interests, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Reliance interests are especially important in cases 
involving contract and property disputes. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 803, 828 (1991) (finding that 
cases involving property and contract disputes, where reliance interests were especially strong, are more 
amenable to the doctrine of stare decisis). However, the Court’s decisions often emphasize the reliance 
interests involved in regards to the judicial goals of stability and reliability, rather than the contractual 
remedy. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 855–56; Starger, supra note 9, at 90. In upholding Roe v. Wade, the 
Court explained how women have relied on Roe and modified their behavior on the presumption that 
the decision will remain. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855–56. The Court further stated:
The Roe rule’s limitation on state power could not be repudiated without serious inequity 
to people who, for two decades of economic and social developments, have organized 
intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their 
places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception 
should fail. The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of 
the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives. The 
Constitution serves human values, and while the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be 
exactly measured, neither can the certain costs of overruling Roe for people who have 
ordered their thinking and living around that case be dismissed. 
 Id. The Court has explained that, generally: “Stare decisis has added force when the legislature, in the 
public sphere, and citizens, in the private realm, have acted in reliance on a previous decision, for in this 
instance overruling the decision would dislodge settled rights and expectations or require an extensive 
legislative response.” Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991).
14. Brandon J. Murrill, Cong. Research Serv., R45319, The Supreme Court’s Overruling of 
Constitutional Precedent 12 (2018).
15. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.
16. Derigan Silver & Dan Kozlowski, Preserving the Law’s Coherence: Citizens United v. FEC and Stare 
Decisis, 21 Comm. L. & Pol’y 39, 51–52 (2016); see also Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(“Rarely if ever has the Court overruled a decision—let alone one of this import—with so little regard 
to the usual principles of stare decisis.”).
17. 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018).
18. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
19. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Delivers a Sharp Blow to Labor Unions, N.Y. Times (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/supreme-court-unions-organized-labor.html.
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to ensure labor peace and prevent “free riders.”20 The Janus Court claimed that its 
departure from the Abood precedent was necessary because it was “poorly reasoned,” 
led to practical problems, was inconsistent with First Amendment cases, and had been 
undermined by recent decisions.21 Notably, the Court dismissed the reliance interests 
involved in Janus as insufficient to justify upholding Abood.22 The Court came to its 
decision without regard to the practical impact the ruling would have on individuals 
and entities that had relied on Abood in organizing their affairs.23 With its focus on 
the “poor reasoning” and dismissal of reliance interests, the Court crippled the 
doctrine of stare decisis.24 This approach fails to properly moderate ideological swings 
and threatens the integrity of the Court as an apolitical body.25
 This Note argues that (1) the Court’s dismissal of the reliance interests significantly 
weakened the doctrine of stare decisis and (2) whether a precedent is “poorly reasoned” 
should not serve as a factor in a stare decisis analysis, but rather, should serve to 
trigger a stare decisis analysis. Part II of this Note explores the evolution of the stare 
decisis doctrine and traces the path to its contemporary form. Part III discusses the 
problems with the current interpretation of stare decisis, as highlighted in Justice 
Alito’s 2018 majority opinion in Janus. Part IV proposes a new stare decisis analysis—
one that, by maintaining a focus on reliance interests, serves to strengthen the 
doctrine. Finally, Part V concludes this Note.
II. HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE & COMPETING INTEPRETATIONS
 A. Tracing the History of Stare Decisis
 Up until the early eighteenth century, common-law judges and scholars followed 
the declaratory theory of common law.26 This theory rested on the notion that the law 
had an “ideal existence” notwithstanding the decision of any one court.27 Thus, any 
judicial declaration that seemed inconsistent with the “ideal existence” could be 
superseded by a new decision.28 In other words, it was the function of the judge not to 
20. Abood, 431 U.S. at 224.
21. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.
22. Id. 
23. In Citizens United, Justice Stevens articulates that relitigating the merits of the precedent in question is 
simply a tool used by justices to overturn precedent that they do not like. See Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 409–11 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Power of Precedent 18 (2008) [hereinafter The Power of Precedent].
25. Id. 
26. Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 
Vand. L. Rev. 647, 659–60 (1999). 
27. Id. at 660.
28. Id. 
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make, but rather, to declare law.29 Accordingly, adherence to prior decisions was not 
necessary because such decisions were merely evidence of the law, not the law itself.30
 In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, there was a shift in ideology 
that laid the foundation for stare decisis.31 During this period, Anglo-American 
courts came to regard past decisions as more persuasive and became compelled to 
articulate some justification for setting aside prior decisions.32 William Blackstone’s 
reasoning is reflected in Founding-Era stare decisis jurisprudence, and his general 
theory, that precedent has binding properties,33 was recognized at the time the 
Constitution was framed.34 Evidence suggests that the Framers intended to include, 
within Article III’s grant of “the judicial Power,”35 the power to create binding law 
and precedent.36 While the Court has stated that stare decisis is “not an inexorable 
command,”37 courts today still recognize that the doctrine is necessary to preserve 
legitimacy and provide stability.38
29. Edward Coke, The Second Part of The Institutes of the Laws of England 51 (1642). 
30. Lee, supra note 26, at 660. 
31. Id. at 661. 
32. Id. William Blackstone expressed this idea in the late eighteenth century by stating that “it is an 
established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come again in litigation; as well as 
to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge’s opinion.” 
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 69 (1765). However, Blackstone 
cautioned that blindly adhering to precedent might not be the best approach “since it sometimes may 
happen that the judge may mistake the law.” Id. at 71.
33. Lee, supra note 26, at 681–84. 
34. Richard H. Fallon, Stare Decisis and the Constitution, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 570, 579 (2001) (“Historians 
record that the doctrine of precedent either was established or becoming established in state courts by 
the time of the Constitutional Convention.”). Alexander Hamilton referenced the role of precedent in 
The Federalist No. 78. He stated that, “to avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable 
that [the courts] should be bound down by strict rules and precedents[.]” The Federalist No. 78 
(Alexander Hamilton) [hereinafter Hamilton]. Hamilton took a very narrow approach to stare decisis, 
believing that precedent should serve as strict rules that bind and define the duty of the court in every 
case. See Lee, supra note 26, at 663. However, The Federalist No. 78 is not a treatise on stare decisis, and 
it is unclear whether Hamilton was merely describing a vertical rule of stare decisis requiring lower 
courts to follow higher federal court precedent. Id. at 664. Other Founding-Era commenters took a 
position similar to Blackstone, writing that stare decisis should be tempered to some degree when there 
is a strong reason for doing so. Id. See also Cranch’s Preface, 5 U.S. iii, iv (1804) (“Every case decided is a 
check upon the judge. He can not decide a familiar case differently, without strong reasons, which, for 
his own justification, he will wish to make public. The avenues to corruption are thus obstructed, and 
the sources of litigation closed.”).
35. U.S. Const. art III, § 1.
36. See Fallon, supra note 34, at 579. While there is no question that decisions of higher courts bind lower 
courts in the same jurisdiction, the Supreme Court is not subject to the same limitations because it is the 
highest court in the United States. See Hamilton, supra note 34.
37. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
38. See The Power of Precedent, supra note 24, at 18. 
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 B. Contemporary Interpretations and Competing Ideologies
 Most contemporary jurists recognize that the Supreme Court is not bound by—
and thus has the power to overrule—its own precedent.39 Two competing positions 
have emerged regarding the degree to which the Court should follow its precedent.40 
The strict—or strong—view of stare decisis calls for adhering to precedent absent 
some particular justification.41 Conversely, the lax—or weak—view accepts overruling 
precedent more easily.42 The lax view was best articulated in 1932 by Justice Louis 
Brandeis’ dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil.43 Under Brandeis’ view, the Court may 
overrule its own precedent when experience, coupled with the passage of time, 
dictates that the “force of better reasoning” must prevail.44 Empirically, Brandeis’ 
view has prevailed, as the Court has overruled precedent over two hundred times in 
its history.45 The strict view of stare decisis was manifested in 1992 when the Court 
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey46 declined to overturn its 1973 decision in Roe v. 
Wade.47 The Casey plurality viewed overruling as appropriate only in narrow 
circumstances, such as when: (1) a rule has become practically unworkable; (2) 
developments in the law have left an old rule a remnant of abandoned doctrine, or (3) 
facts have changed to a degree that the old rule is simply inapplicable.48 This strict 
view directs the Court to follow its precedent regardless of whether it was wrong or 
poorly reasoned.49
 These two views of stare decisis essentially differ in the deference given to the 
underlying reasoning of the precedent in question.50 The lax view justifies overturning 
39. Starger, supra note 9, at 89. 
40. Id. at 90–91.
41. Id. at 90.
42. Id.
43. 285 U.S. 393, 405–13 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Brandeis stated:
Stare decisis is not, like the rule of res judicata, a universal inexorable command. . . . 
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that 
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. This is commonly true 
even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by 
legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through 
legislative action is practically impossible, this court has often overruled its earlier 
decisions.
 Id. (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 408. 
45. See Table of Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Decisions, Constitution Annotated, 
https://constitution.congress.gov/conan/appendix/decisions-overruled/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2020).
46. 505 U.S. 833, 854–69 (1992).
47. 401 U.S. 1113 (1973) (holding that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy 
in its early stages). 
48. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854–55. 
49. Starger, supra note 9, at 92. 
50. Id. 
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poorly reasoned precedent and authorizes more change and f luidity in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.51 The strict view places little emphasis on a precedent’s 
reasoning and focuses on the importance of promoting stability and the rule of law.52
 Regardless of whether one takes a strict or lax view of stare decisis, there are 
sound policy rationales for adherence to Supreme Court precedent, at least to some 
extent.53 The doctrine remains functionally desirable because it promotes stability, 
protects settled expectations, conserves judicial resources, and adds predictability to 
the everyday affairs of citizens.54 Further, stare decisis acts as a bastion of legitimacy 
by moderating potential ideological swings and assuring the public that the Court is 
an apolitical legal institution.55 Significantly weakening or eliminating the doctrine 
undermines the rule of law and “represent[s] an explicit endorsement of the idea that 
the Constitution is nothing more than what five Justices say it is.”56
III. THE PROBLEM: CONTINUED WEAKENING OF STARE DECISIS
 Over the last decade, two Supreme Court decisions—Citizens United and Janus—
have weakened the doctrine of stare decisis in significant ways.57 In 2010, the Court in 
Citizens United 58 overruled two Supreme Court decisions from 1990 and 2003, Austin 
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce59 and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 
respectively.60 The majority reasoned:
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (“We recognize that stare decisis embodies an 
important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic 
need to satisfy reasonable expectations.”).
54. Fallon, supra note 34, at 587–88; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and 
Evolution in Constitutional Doctrine, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 67, 70 (1988).
55. Fallon, supra note 34, at 587–88.
56. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 281, 288 (1990).
57. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 411 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“Stare decisis protects not only personal rights involving property or contract but 
also the ability of the elected branches to shape their laws in an effective and coherent fashion. Today’s 
decision takes away a power that we have long permitted these branches to exercise.”); Janus v. 
AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2497 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). In the Janus dissent, 
Justice Elena Kagan states:
But the worse part of today’s opinion is where the majority subverts all known principles 
of stare decisis. The majority makes plain, in the first 33 pages of its decision, that it 
believes Abood was wrong. But even if that were true (which it is not), it is not enough. 
Respecting stare decisis means sticking to some wrong decisions.
 Id. (citations omitted).
58. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 312.
59. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
60. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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The relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare 
decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, 
and of course whether the decision was well reasoned. [The Court has] also 
examined whether experience has pointed up the precedent’s shortcomings.61
In 2018, the majority in Janus eschewed the doctrine of stare decisis by overturning 
its 1977 decision in Abood.62 The majority reasoned that Abood was “poorly reasoned,” 
led to practical problems, and was inconsistent with other First Amendment cases.63 
Most importantly, the Court dismissed the reliance interests as insufficient to justify 
upholding the precedent and thus, overruled Abood.64 Like in Citizens United, the 
Court in Janus came to the conclusion that the prior decision—Abood—was not well-
reasoned and therefore overturned it.65
 The majority opinions in Citizens United and Janus erode the doctrine of stare 
decisis in two ways. First, by focusing on the merits of the reasoning in the past 
Court decisions in question, the Court made it easier to overturn decisions that any 
current majority of the Court disfavors. This is dangerous because an application of 
stare decisis that results in overturning precedent primarily on the merits of its 
reasoning leaves the door open for politically motivated actors to manipulate our law 
by placing partisan justices on the Court—causing further politization.66 This is 
evidenced from the increased political jockeying involved in Supreme Court 
nominations.67 Political leaders of both parties understand that if they are able to get 
a justice on the Court who disagrees with prior jurisprudence, precedent will not be 
upheld.68 Weakening the doctrine of stare decisis by relitigating the merits of 
important precedent undermines the Court’s image as an apolitical body.
 Second, the Janus opinion significantly weakens the importance of one of the 
traditional factors of the stare decisis analysis—reliance interests. Most jurists agree 
61. Citizens United, 558 U.S at 362–63 (citation omitted). 
62. Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448.
63. Id. at 2460.
64. Id. at 2560.
65. Id.
66. See Andrew Chung, Conservative U.S. Justices Draw Criticism by Overruling Precedent Again, Reuters 
( June 21, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-precedent/conservative-u-s-justices-
draw-criticism-by-overruling-precedent-again-idUSKCN1TM27G (stating that stare decisis “protects 
the court’s credibility by avoiding politization” and discussing the then-recent Supreme Court decisions 
in which the Court’s conservative majority failed to adhere to stare decisis, which “rais[ed] alarm bells 
among its liberal members.”)
67. See Daniel Bush & Jessica Yarvin, Is The Hyper-Partisan Supreme Court Confirmation Process ‘The New 
Normal ’?, PBS NewsHour (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/is-the-hyper-
partisan-supreme-court-confirmation-process-the-new-normal.
68. Rick Noack, The U.S. Supreme Court is Highly Politicized. It Doesn’t Have to be That Way., The Wash. 
Post ( June 28, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/06/28/the-u-s-
supreme-court-is-highly-politicized-it-doesnt-have-to-be-that-way/?noredirect=on.
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that reliance interests should be weighed by the Court when considering overturning 
precedent.69 Even Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Janus acknowledges that:
Our cases identify factors that should be taken into account in deciding 
whether to overrule a past decision. Five of these are most important here: the 
quality of Abood’s reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, its 
consistency with other related decisions, developments since the decision was 
handed down, and reliance on the decision.70
However, the opinion goes on to dismiss the reliance interests involved in Janus as 
insufficient to support upholding the precedent,71 arguing that the poor reasoning in 
Abood countervails any reliance interests involved.72 Moreover, by dismissing the 
reliance interests involved in Janus—a case involving significant contract interests 
where thousands of contracts had been drafted in reliance of the rule in Abood—
Alito and the Court significantly weaken the importance of reliance interests in 
future cases involving contract and property rights.73 Reliance interests have 
traditionally been “at their acme” in cases involving property and contract rights.74 
Here, even with tremendous contract interest ramifications at stake, the Court 
dismisses the importance of reliance interests.75
 Most concerning, however, is Justice Alito’s reasoning in dismissing the reliance 
interests. Alito reasoned that reliance is lessened because “public-sector unions have 
been on notice for years regarding this Court’s misgivings about Abood.”76 Essentially, 
Alito claimed that unions should have been “on notice” because the Court had 
69. Murrill, supra note 14, at 18–22.
70. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478–79.
71. Id. at 2484. 
72. See id. Justice Alito ignored one of the main tenets of stare decisis as articulated by Justice Brandeis in 
his Burnet dissent: “[I]n most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than 
it be settled right. This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serous concern[.]” Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
73. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2499–2500 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In her dissent, Justice Kagan 
stated: 
The majority undoes bargains reached all over the country. It prevents the parties from 
fulfilling other commitments they have made based on those agreements. It forces the 
parties—immediately—to renegotiate once-settled terms and create new tradeoffs. It 
does so knowing that many of the parties will have to revise (or redo) multiple contracts 
simultaneously. . . . It does so knowing that those renegotiations will occur in an 
environment of legal uncertainty, as state governments scramble to enact new labor 
legislation. It does so with no real clue of what will happen next—of how its action will 
alter public-sector labor relations. It does so even though the government services 
affected—policing, firefighting, teaching, transportation, sanitation (and more)—
affect the quality of life of tens of millions of Americans.
 Id. (citations omitted).
74. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 803, 828 (1991). 
75. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.
76. Id. at 2484. 
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articulated, in two subsequent opinions, that it had misgivings about Abood.77 
Therefore, according to Alito, reliance is diminished because any public-sector union 
interested in seeking nonmember fees “must have understood that the constitutionality 
of such a provision was uncertain.”78 Taking this logic a step further presents an even 
more concerning implication. According to Alito, if individuals or entities should 
know—or are “on notice”—that precedent has been questioned or is in jeopardy of 
being overturned, then they should not rely on the precedent.79 But other justices 
believe that “reliance upon a square, unabandoned holding of the Supreme Court is 
always justifiable reliance, regardless of whether that holding seems (to someone or 
another) unusually dubious on the merits.”80 Individuals and entities should be able 
to rely on what the law is, not what the law might be.
 The Court’s interpretation and application of stare decisis in Janus leaves the 
doctrine weakened and lacking the bite necessary to ensure it limits the furtherance 
of political agendas in the Court. Without considering the practical effects a change 
in the law might have, the Court is free to focus on the reasoning of the precedent 
and decide whether it likes the decision in question. If it finds the reasoning to be 
poor, then the decision may be overturned without regard to the parties involved or 
the impact on society. Any change in the political composition of the Court leaves 
all of those seemingly settled principles that society, and other actors, have relied 
upon open for reconsideration.81 To combat this potentially tumultuous deconstruction 
of our legal system, the doctrine of stare decisis must be strengthened by focusing on 
the societal impact a change in the law might have, rather than the reasoning of the 
precedent in question.
IV.  STRENGTHEN BY RESTRUCTURING WITH A FOCUS ON RELIANCE
 The weakening of stare decisis undermines the legitimacy of the Court and calls 
into question its apolitical status.82 To counter these problems, the doctrine of stare 
decisis needs to be strengthened in two ways. First, the stare decisis analysis must be 
restructured. A precedent’s “soundness of reasoning” should not serve as a factor in 
the Court’s stare decisis analysis—as it did in Citizens United and Janus—but rather, 
77. Id. The two cases cited by Justice Alito that catalogue the Court’s misgivings are Knox v. Service 
Employees and Harris v. Quinn. Id. In Knox, the Court found that compelling nonmembers to pay a 
portion of union dues represents something of an anomaly. Knox v. Serv. Emps., 567 U.S. 298, 311 
(2012). In Harris, the Court considered the holding in Abood to be an anomaly. Harris v. Quinn, 573 
U.S. 616, 626–28 (2014).
78. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2485.
79. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 313 (2010).
80. Kozel, supra note 3, at 420 (citations omitted).
81. See generally Frank H. Esterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 
422, 422 (1988) (outlining the interactions between text and precedent throughout U.S. history based 
on changes in the Court).
82. See Noack, supra note 68.
146
RESTORING STARE DECISIS IN THE WAKE OF JANUS v. AFSCME, COUNCIL 31 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 64 | 2019/20
should trigger a stare decisis analysis.83 Eliminating the “soundness of reasoning” 
factor from a stare decisis analysis prevents the Court from relitigating the merits of 
the precedent in question.84 Professor Fred Schauer85 articulated the problem with 
relitigating the merits of precedent: 
If precedent is seen as a rule directing a decisionmaker to take prior decisions 
into account, then it follows that a pure argument from precedent, unlike an 
argument from experience, depends only on the results of those decisions, and 
not on the validity of the reasons supporting those results. . . . When the 
strength of a current conclusion totally stands or falls on arguments for or 
against that conclusion, there is no appeal to precedent, even if the same 
conclusion has been reached in the past.86
Arguments contending that precedent was poorly reasoned are simply vehicles which 
may be used by justices to overrule certain decisions based on personal disfavor or 
political views.87
 However, one exception to this proposed analysis must be considered. When it is 
certain that precedent is “clearly erroneous,” then the “soundness of reasoning” of the 
decision may be a factor in the Court’s stare decisis analysis.88 A decision is “clearly 
erroneous” if reasonable justices may agree that the decision was poorly reasoned or 
fundamentally incorrect.89 When precedent is “clearly erroneous,” the Court is able 
to reconsider the precedent’s reasoning where, the combination of experience and 
time serve to illustrate that the previous decision was manifestly incorrect.90 
Analyzing precedent through the lens of this exception allows the Court to overturn 
decisions that are incongruent with contemporary norms—where failure to overturn 
such decisions would result in stunting society’s progress.91 An interpretation of stare 
83. Esterbrook, supra note 81, at 418. 
84. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 409 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
85. Frederick Schauer is the David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of 
Virginia. See Panelist, 2019 Leon Jaworski Program, A.B.A. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/public_education/Programs/jaworski-public-programs/2019-jaworski-public-programs/
frederick-schauer. He was the Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment at Harvard University 
from 1990 to 2008. Id.
86. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 576 (1987).
87. Id.
88. See Kozel, supra note 3, at 418 (exploring what he calls “the degree-of-wrongness” theory).
89. See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984–86 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
90. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605–08 (2015) (overruling Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 
(1972), by declaring that the fundamental constitutional right to marry extends to same-sex couples and 
citing contemporary cultural views on the nature of marriage). 
91. Tom Hardy, Has Mighty Casey Struck Out: Societal Reliance and the Supreme Court’s Modern Stare Decisis 
Analysis, 34 Hastings Const. L.Q. 591, 615 (2007). 
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decisis that contends otherwise would “bring adjudications of this tribunal into the 
same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only.”92
 The second way to strengthen the doctrine of stare decisis is to make the reliance 
interests and societal impact of changing the law key factors when determining 
whether precedent should be overturned.93 The Court’s evisceration of the reliance 
interest factor in Janus is troubling given the substantial contract interests involved in 
the case—an area of law where the Court would normally defer to precedent to 
protect the actors who relied on the then-existing law when negotiating and entering 
into contracts.94
 Courts should contemplate reliance interests on a spectrum in order to determine 
the extent to which they should be relied on. On one end of this spectrum is super-
precedent—decisions that will likely never be overturned because they are so 
ingrained in society that overturning them might disturb societal and governmental 
foundations.95 On the other end of the spectrum is precedent that—through the 
passage of time and shifting societal norms—has become patently incompatible with 
contemporary society.96 This type of precedent falls into the “clearly erroneous” 
category and thus, dovetails nicely with the restructured stare decisis analysis 
suggested in this Note. In “clearly erroneous” cases, it is evident that the precedent in 
question should no longer be relied upon and thus, may be overturned.97
 Cases that fall between these two extremes are more difficult to classify. This 
Note does not attempt to do so, and any such determination will likely center around 
the Court’s analysis of the specific facts of each case. This Note does suggest that the 
92. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“I have no assurance . . . that 
the opinion announced today may not be shortly repudiated and overruled by justices who deem they 
have new light on the subject.”).
93. See Kozel, supra note 3, at 452. 
94. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478–79 (2018); see also, Kozel, supra note 3, at 452 –
55. Kozel identifies four different species of reliance that must be taken into account when considering 
stare decisis. Id. Specific reliance encourages actors to behave in a certain manner confident that the law 
will remain the law of the land. Id. at 453. Governmental reliance considers the effect on the legislative 
and executive branches of the government. Id. at 454. Doctrinal reliance considers the effect on the 
other branches of the judiciary and the Supreme Court itself. Id. at 459. Finally, societal reliance 
considers the effect of the precedent on societal behavior and norms. Id. at 460.
95. Gerhardt, supra note 5, at 1214. Gerhardt explains that in some of the Supreme Court’s foundational 
decisions justly labeled as “super-precedent,” reliance is one of the main reasons for upholding such 
precedent. Id. Discussing the Legal Tender Cases—cases that established the constitutionality of paper 
currency—Gerhardt notes:
There has been extraordinary social, political, and economic reliance on this decision in 
both the public and private sectors. Indeed, no one—not even scholars who believe the 
case was wrongly decided—seriously believes the decision ought to be revisited. The 
prospect of the social, political, and economic disaster that would result from its 
overruling makes it a permanent fixture in American Constitutional law.
 Id.
96. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Shifting political and social norms created an 
environment where society demanded that the holding from Plessy no longer be relied upon. See id.
97. Id. 
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issue in Janus clearly involved property and contract rights and thus, would 
traditionally have been protected by stare decisis from being overruled. Overturning 
Abood had a direct impact on the rights of the parties who relied on the law set forth 
in the case; therefore, Janus should have been classified as super-precedent as opposed 
to a “clearly erroneous” case.98 By minimizing reliance interests in cases such as Janus, 
the Court severely undermines the effectiveness of the stare decisis doctrine for cases 
that would normally demand extra protection. The Court created dangerous 
precedent that paves the way for future incarnations of the Court to similarly 
disregard reliance interests in cases that would demand otherwise.
 The Court must continue to respect the individuals, groups, and entities that 
have come to rely on settled precedent put down by the Court.99 These actors rely on 
the law to establish certain courses of behavior and should be confident that the law 
will remain settled. The majority opinion in Janus dispenses with reliance interests 
because the individuals affected should have known that precedent was likely to be 
overturned.100 This reasoning represents a fundamental misunderstanding of stare 
decisis.101 Namely, that reliance on good law is always justifiable reliance.102
V. CONCLUSION
 The Court is trending in a direction that signals it is no longer an apolitical 
body;103 and therefore, the doctrine of stare decisis must be strengthened to reestablish 
the legitimacy of the Court. If precedent is routinely overturned and decisions to 
overturn are driven—even if only in appearance—by a political agenda, the public’s 
faith in the Court will only continue its downward spiral.104 By restructuring the 
stare decisis analysis to eliminate the focus on the reasoning of the precedent in 
question, the Court will be forced to consider the societal impact a change in law 
will have and, most importantly, it will be unable to overturn precedent in a politically 
motivated manner. This restructured stare decisis analysis strengthens the doctrine, 
allowing it to serve as the appropriate agenda-limiting function necessary to rebuild, 
and preserve, the Court as an apolitical arbiter of justice.
98. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
99. See Kozel, supra note 3, at 454.
100. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2484.
101. Id. 
102. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 409 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part).
103. David Paul Kuhn, The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of the Supreme Court, The Atlantic 
( June 29, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-polarization-
and-politicization-of-the-supreme-court/259155/.
104. See Silver & Kozlowski, supra note 16, at 48.
